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Throughout much of the past two decades, contextual behavioral science has been applied to a diverse
spectrum of psychological phenomena. This intellectual voyage into uncharted waters has brought with
it exciting new developments at the methodological and theoretical levels as well as increased contact
with other philosophical frameworks such as mechanism. This expansion into new territories requires
that the researcher carefully walk a tight-rope between different intellectual traditions—an activity
that is subject to several challenges and dangers. In the following paper we provide a detailed map on
how to navigate such pitfalls in the study of implicit cognition. We open with a comprehensive
overview of the core assumptions and analytic strategies upon which the cognitive (mechanistic) and
functional (contextual) traditions have been built. As we shall see, both traditions have sought to
understand, predict, and in some cases influence, behavior using radically different conceptual,
theoretical and methodological tools. The Relational Elaboration and Coherence (REC) model as well
as the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) are offered as examples of how researchers can
explore the domain of implicit cognition from a purely functional perspective. Finally, we examine the
possibility that although the cognitive and functional frameworks operate at two independent levels of
analysis each may be mutually informed by the work of the other, to the benefit of both.
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Psychological science has long sought to unravel the enigma of
how the inner and private world of the individual interacts with
their overt behavior (for reviews see Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010;
Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011; Payne & Gawronski, 2010). More
often than not, this work has been inspired by finding that people
behave in two different and potentially conflicting ways. On the
one hand, and consistent with our intuitive beliefs about beha-
vior, we can respond to stimuli in our environment in a non-
automatic fashion. These ‘‘explicit’’ responses are argued to be
controlled, ‘‘intentional, made with awareness and require cog-
nitive resources’’ (Nosek, 2007, p. 65) and are typically registered
using direct measurement procedures such as questionnaires,
interviews, and focus groups. On the other hand, our history of
interacting with the social environment can also result in the
formation of automatic or ‘‘implicit’’ responses that are charac-
terized by differing degrees of awareness, intention and control
(see Gawronski & Payne, 2010) and are often assessed using
indirect procedures such as semantic and evaluative priming
(Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Wittenbrink, Judd, &
Park, 1997), the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the Implicit Relational Assess-
ment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006; for an over-
view of these tasks see Nosek et al., 2011; Gawronski &
De Houwer, in press).1
An extensive literature now indicates that automatic and
controlled responses correspond with one another when phobic
stimuli (Teachman, 2007), consumer preferences (Maison,
Greenwald, & Bruin, 2004) and political orientation (Choma &
Hafer, 2009) are subject to inquiry. However, under specific
conditions – and with respect to certain stimuli – automatic
and controlled responding may also conflict. For instance, people
often show automatic negative responses to members of other
racial, ethnic or religious groups despite their self-reported
egalitarian sentiments (McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Payne,
Burkley, & Stokes, 2008). Automatic responses may not only
correspond or diverge from controlled behaviors but – perhaps
more importantly – differentially, additively or interactively
predict future actions over and above their non-automatic coun-
terparts (see Perugini, Richetin, & Zogmaister, 2010). For example,
the degree to which people seeking psychiatric treatment auto-
matically relate the self with death/suicide predicts their1 Following De Houwer (2008), we define a procedure as either direct or
indirect on the basis of its procedural properties and the outcome or effect of a
procedure as either implicit or explicit based on the properties of the processes by
which the attribute influences behavior. Although cognitive researchers often use
terms such as implicit and explicit to distinguish conscious from unconscious
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) or automatic from controlled processes (De Houwer,
Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009), functional researchers employ these
same terms simply as descriptive labels for different classes of behavior rather
than mediating mental mechanisms. That said, several researchers have recently
attempted to provide a functional definition of automaticity (De Houwer, & Moors,
in press).likelihood of attempting suicide in the following 6 months
(Nock et al., 2010), while automatic evaluative responding to
one’s partner predicts risk of future relationship breakup (Lee,
Rogge, & Reis, 2010). Likewise, the quality and quantity of social
interactions with members of other racial or ethnic groups
(McConnell & Leibold, 2001), voting behavior (Galdi, Arcuri, &
Gawronski, 2008) and likelihood of engaging in safe sex behaviors
(Czopp, Monteith, Zimmerman, & Lynam, 2004) have all been
predicted on the basis of automatic responding.
As in any area of (psychological) science, researchers interested in
the study of implicit cognition have adopted a set of philosophical
assumptions about the research domain, appropriate units of analysis
and relevant truth criteria. When taken together, these pre-analytic
assumptions provide the philosophical scaffold upon which indivi-
dual theories have been built, methodologies crafted and empirical
findings interpreted (see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer,
2011). Although a number of philosophical frameworks or ‘‘world-
views’’ have been proposed to guide scientific activity (Pepper, 1942;
Hayes, Hayes, & Reese, 1988), research in this area has been
dominated by psychologists subscribing to a cognitive (mechanistic)
– and to a lesser degree – functional (contextual) position (referred to
hereafter as the mechanistic and functional approaches).
In the following paper we open with a detailed overview of the
core assumptions and analytic strategies upon which the mechanistic
and functional traditions have been built. Clarifying the goals of
science, nature of truth and the basic units that different researchers
adopt in the study of implicit cognition will provide the reader with
an essential background against which to evaluate the rationale for
past and future developments within this research area. Although the
mechanistic approach has long guided this research enterprise we
offer the Relational Elaboration and Coherence (REC) model as well as
the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as examples of
how researchers can explore this intellectual domain from a purely
functional perspective. Importantly, this expansion into new territories
requires that the researcher carefully walk the tight-rope between the
mechanistic and functional traditions – an activity that is subject
to several challenges and dangers. We outline how researchers can
avoid these problems by maintaining a firm separation between the
mechanistic and functional levels of analysis. Finally, and in line with
recent work by De Houwer (2011), we close by examining the
possibility that although the mechanistic and functional frameworks
operate at two independent levels of analysis each may be mutually
informed by the work of the other, to the benefit of both.2. The mechanistic approach to psychological science
Arguably, the majority of empirical work within contemporary
psychology – and implicit cognition in particular – has been
conducted by researchers operating within a mechanistic world-
view. Broadly speaking, mechanists conceptualize (psychological)
events as being similar to a machine, composed of discrete parts
that interact and are subject to specific operating conditions
Learning History
Behaviour
Operating Processes
&Procedure
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perspective is twofold. First, the basic mental processes that
mediate between input (environment) and output (behavior)
must be identified. The constituent elements of a particular
mental system can be described independently of one another
and their fundamental structure remains the same when com-
bined or in interaction with other mental constructs. They are
often treated as ontologically ‘‘valid’’ such that the researcher’s
primary role involves developing an account of phenomena that
actually exist and interact with behavior. The truth or scientific
value of a mechanistic model is therefore based on the correspon-
dence between the mental construct it proposes and the set of
behavioral observations that it aims to predict. Put simply,
mechanistic researchers are primarily focused on the prediction
of behavior through the use of theoretical models that bridge past
events and current responses. Such models are usually high in
precision and low in scope. For example, a mental model may
specify in elaborate detail the operating processes and conditions
responsible for implicit cognition yet remain silent to other
cognitive phenomenon such as language, intelligence or perspec-
tive taking (see Gawronski & Creighton, in press).2
At the same time, mechanistic researchers must also identify
the operating conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for
mental processes to successfully function. Stated more precisely,
mental processes are argued to operate under a restricted set of
conditions and these are separate from, but co-vary with, the
environmental context under which behavior is observed (Moors
& De Houwer, 2006; Moors, Spruytm, & De Houwer, 2010). From
this perspective, different measurement procedures will provide a
more or less sensitive index of different mental processes depend-
ing on whether their procedural properties correspond with the
operating conditions necessary for those processes to occur. For
instance, many researchers treat the procedural properties of indirect
procedures, such as speed or accuracy criteria, low task complexity
and the absence of a requirement to self-report activity as either
correlated with or equivalent to the assumed operating conditions
necessary to observe automatic cognition and thus automatic beha-
vior (e.g., efficient, unaware, uncontrollable, unintentional). Likewise,
procedural properties that typically characterize direct procedures
such as an absence of speed or accuracy criteria, high task complexity
or the requirement to verbally report activity, are argued to corre-
spond to the operating conditions necessary for non-automatic
mental activity and thus non-automatic behavior (e.g., non-efficient,
aware, controllable and intentional; see De Houwer et al., 2009).3
In other words, ‘‘the correspondence between the conditions estab-
lished by a certain kind of measurement procedure (indirect vs.
direct) and the operating conditions of a certain kind of mental
process (automatic vs. controlled) is a fundamental assumption’’ for
mechanistic researchers (Peters, 2011, p. 6).
To summarize, when a mechanistic framework is adopted,
behavioral causation is the product of mental mediation. Under-
standing the world therefore requires that the basic units that fill
the temporal gaps between one event and another be identified.
This assumption serves to orientate empirical attention away2 It should be noted that mechanistic researchers distinguish between various
types of mental mediators, such that some fundamental mental concept (e.g.,
representation) is acted upon by a mental process (e.g. spread of activation, truth
validation) and these mental processes in turn operate under different mental
conditions (e.g., conscious, efficient, intentional and controllable; see Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2011).
3 Clarifying the relationship between operating processes and conditions in
the study of implicit cognition is made all the more difficult given that
automaticity is often defined in terms of a number of subcomponents that
different mental processes may or may not demonstrate in certain contexts and
different procedures may or may not target depending on their particular
properties (De Houwer et al., 2009).from environment–behavior interactions and towards proximal
causes that are assumed to generate the behavior obtained on a
given procedure. The result is a largely hypothetico-deductive and
theory-driven research agenda. As we shall see, this mechanistic
world-view has shaped the theoretical and methodological land-
scape of implicit cognition research for several decades now.3. The mechanistic approach to implicit cognition
Although there are non-trivial differences across mental mod-
els of implicit cognition, the assumption that an individual’s
learning history and current context indirectly influence the
behavior obtained on a measurement procedure – through the
operation of a set of mental processes and conditions – is central
to many, if not most mechanistic accounts (see Fig. 1). In the
following sections we consider the implications and challenges
associated with explaining different patterns of behavior in-line
with this pre-analytic assumption.
3.1. Operating processes and conditions
In light of the fact that automatic responding can correspond or
conflict with non-automatic behavior, as well as predict important
real-world outcomes, increased attention has been paid to how this
particular class of responses is established, manipulated, and changed.
For cognitive (mechanistic) researchers this has involved constructing
and testing theories to explain how mental processes and conditions
interact with one another to guide implicit and explicit cognition (e.g.,
Albarracin, Glasman, & Wallace, 2004; Fazio, 2007; Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2011; Greenwald et al., 2002; Lieberman, Gaunt,
Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; Petty, Brin˜ol, & DeMarre, 2007; Rydell &
McConnell, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
These various accounts differ in the importance they allocate to
specific mental processes/representations and the conditions under
which they function.
What is important to note here is that irrespective of the particular
construct, the vast majority of models conceptualizes automatic and
controlled responding as the product of proximal mental events.
Whether framed as a single process account involving associations
(Fazio, 2007; Petty et al., 2007), a dual process model involving
reflective-impulsive systems (Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van
Bavel, 2007; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), a combination of associa-
tions and propositions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011; Rydell &
McConnell, 2006), or multiple interactive memory systems (Amodio
& Ratner, 2011; Smith & DeCoster, 2000), the idea that contiguous
mental mechanisms mediate between environment and behavior is
foundational. At the same time, the above models also share theCurrent Context
Conditions 
Fig. 1. Behavior causation according to the cognitive (mechanistic) framework.
The effects of learning history and wider context impact on behavior indirectly
through a set of mediating (mental) operating processes and conditions. Construct
relevant and irrelevant properties of the procedure determine what operating
conditions and processes are assumed to be causally related to behavior and
whether that behavior is deemed automatic or controlled. Note that while the
procedure is a feature of the current context, we highlight it here given its
explanatory importance within the mechanistic literature.
S. Hughes et al. / Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 1 (2012) 17–3820assumption that mental processes often occur under mental operat-
ing conditions referred to the ‘‘four horsemen of automaticity’’:
awareness, intentionality, efficiency, and control (Bargh, 1994;
De Houwer & Moors, 2010).4 For instance, some authors argue that
the degree to which automatically activated associations guide
‘‘downstream’’ overt behavior depends on two operating conditions:
the cognitive resources available to the person and their motivation
and opportunity to deploy them (Olson & Fazio, 2009; Petty et al.,
2007). For others, behavior is rooted in two conceptually distinct
kinds of processes (i.e., associative linking vs. propositional reason-
ing) that operate under different subcomponents of automaticity
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011).
In short, mechanistic theories are primarily concerned with
how mental constructs are formed, activated and changed as well
as influence subsequent behavior. With respect to implicit cogni-
tion, this involves identifying the operating processes that suggest
what a given construct is doing (e.g., associative activation,
propositional reasoning) and the operating conditions that indi-
cate when that process takes place (e.g., when cognitive resources
and time are restricted or when the person intends to manipulate
the process or its outcome).3.2. Learning history and current context
Although an individual’s learning history and the current
context influence the behavioral outcomes obtained from direct
and indirect procedures, they do so distally through their influ-
ence on the aforementioned operating processes and conditions.
On the one hand, a history of learning with respect to particular
stimuli may extend backwards in time to early socialization
experiences (Rudman, Phelan, & Heppen, 2007; Sinclair, Dunn, &
Lowery, 2005) or involve more recent social interactions (Shook &
Fazio, 2008), descriptive information (Gawronski, Rydell, Vervliet,
& De Houwer, 2010) or contingencies established within the
laboratory (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez,
2010; for a review see Gawronski & Sritharan, 2010). In each case,
however, the learning processes and boundary conditions that
influence the behavioral change are of interest only in so far as
they specify how and when mental processes/representations
function. For example, interactions between the person and
environment in the form of respondent learning (Olson & Fazio,
2001), operant learning (Peters & Gawronski, 2011), stimulus
generalization (Ranganath & Nosek, 2008) or verbal instruction
(Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006) are conceptualized as influencing
the ‘‘strength’’ of mental associations between stimuli in memory
and it is these associations that govern the subsequent response
(see also Rydell & Gawronski, 2009). Specifically, the strength of
stored associations is often assumed to dictate the degree to
which previously encoded information is automatically reacti-
vated when a stimulus is encountered and an automatic response
emitted.54 Although operating conditions such as intention, control, efficiency and
awareness refer to properties of the mental construct under investigation (and
thus why we placed them inside the ‘‘black-box’’ in Fig. 1) it is possible to define
these various features of automaticity purely in terms of observable elements in
the environment (De Houwer & Moors, in press). When treated in this way,
operating conditions no longer reside within the mental ‘‘black-box’’ but represent
features of the past and present context. Note, however, that this ‘‘functional
decompositional’’ approach to automaticity does not reflect the established
orthodoxy within the mechanistic literature (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen,
2011).
5 Mechanistic researchers often treat explicit evaluations as the product of
‘‘propositional learning processes’’ and implicit evaluations as the product of
‘‘associative learning processes’’ (e.g., Peters & Gawronski, 2011; McConnell,
Rydell, Strain & Mackie, 2008). That said, it is not entirely clear to what degree
associative and propositional learning processes involve or at least correspond toOn the other hand, the environment – whether in the form of
the current or historical context – is treated as an object such that
the person’s actions occur in it but the causes of that behavior are
separate from it. More often than not, cues in the environment are
argued to differentially influence the activation of mental asso-
ciations in memory and the behavior resulting from such activity.
Consider, for example, the well-replicated finding that automatic
evaluative responding towards African Americans differs accord-
ing to the context in which they are presented (e.g., church-
interior versus street corner; Wittenbrink et al., 2001). Several
researchers propose that the mental associations established by
the person’s learning history are highly stable and resistant to
changes across time and context (Olson & Fazio, 2009; Petty et al.,
2007). Thus responding more positively to African Americans
when depicted in a church – and more negatively in an urban
setting – is understood not in terms of variations in context but
instead as differences in how stimuli are categorized or whether
responding reflects the endorsement of extra-personal or perso-
nal associations. In such cases, features of the current context are
thought to contaminate the assessment of a person’s ‘‘true’’ and
enduring evaluative disposition as well as limit the ability to
predict future behavior. In contrast, others argue that automatic
evaluative responding is acutely sensitive to changes in context,
with different patterns of associations momentarily activated as a
function of the cues present in the environment (Ferguson &
Bargh, 2004; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011; Schwarz, 2007).
According to these accounts, encountering a stimulus within a
given context (e.g. black person in a church) only serves to
activate a limited number of all the possible associations available
in memory related to that stimulus. In this way the same stimulus
will elicit different evaluative responses depending on the context
in which it is encountered and the pre-existing associations in
memory.
In short, variation in automatic responding across different
situations is often explained in one of two ways. The first views
the associations established through the person’s interaction
with their environment as ‘‘context-insensitive’’; highly durable
and robust to change. The second view is a ‘‘context-sensitive’’
one in which a subset of mental associations are activated when
the individual’s learning history interacts with the current
context.3.3. Procedural properties (construct relevant)
Although direct and indirect procedures represent features of
the current context, they have attracted considerably more
attention within the mechanistic literature than many other
environmental variables relevant to implicit cognition. Broadly
speaking, a procedure constitutes a systemic structuring of an
environmental situation aimed at generating a behavioral out-
come. ‘‘It specifies, among other things, the way in which stimuli
should be presented, responses registered, and the outcome
derived from those responses’’ (De Houwer, 2007, p. 231). Given
that mechanistic researchers are focused on discovering the
‘‘true’’ mental construct(s) that mediate between environment
and behavior, the effect obtained with a procedure is typically
treated as the causal product of variations in the underlying
mental attribute or process of interest. To illustrate this more
clearly, consider two different indirect procedures commonly(footnote continued)
the operation of respondent, operant or relational learning as functionally
understood.
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and evaluative priming.6
On the IAT a target (e.g., Average Weight) and attribute
stimulus (e.g., Good) are presented in close spatial proximity on
one side of a computer screen and a second target (Over Weight)
and attribute (Bad) on the other. Participants are presented with a
successive stream of positive and negative words as well as
pictures of average weight and obese individuals in the middle
of the screen and required to categorize those stimuli with their
respective category labels. More rapid and accurate responding
when stimuli are mapped to the same response option (Over
Weight–Bad; Average Weight–Good) versus different response
options (Over Weight–Good; Average Weight–Bad) allows for an
inference to be made about how those stimuli are automatically
associated in memory (e.g., Teachman & Brownell, 2001). Simi-
larly, participants completing an evaluative priming task encoun-
ter a sequence of trials in which a prime (picture of an average
weight person) and target stimulus (Good) are presented in close
temporal proximity. During the task only the target has to be
processed along an evaluative dimension while the prime is
treated as an irrelevant distractor. The speed and/or accuracy
with which participants respond to the prime-target relationship
across different conditions is treated as a proxy for the automatic
activation or processing of the prime stimulus (Cserjesi et al.,
2010).
In other words, although the IAT and priming tasks differ in
several notable ways, the observable outcome resulting from a
core property of both procedures (i.e., the temporal or spatially
contiguous presentations of stimuli) is often treated as the causal
product of a particular mental process (i.e., activation of mental
associations in memory). This mechanistic assumption underpins
not only the IAT and evaluative priming but nearly every indirect
procedure constructed to date, including the Stimulus Response
Compatibility Task (SRCT; Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De Houwer,
2003), Implicit Association Procedure (Schnabel, Banse, &
Asendorpf, 2006), Go/No-go Association Task (Nosek & Banaji,
2001) and Affective Misattribution Procedure (Payne, Cheng,
Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). Irrespective of their idiosyncratic
features (e.g., physical pairing of stimuli, approach versus avoid-
ance responding) the behavioral effects generated by these
measurement tools are taken to correspond to an underlying
mental mechanism (see Gawronski & De Houwer, in press).
Despite this assumption, a growing body of research indicates
that the behavioral outcomes obtained from indirect procedures
do not provide a one-to-one correspondence with associative/
heuristic/impulsive processes nor do performances on direct
procedures map directly onto propositional/systematic/reflexive
processes. For instance, ‘‘associative’’ measures such as the IAT
and priming are sensitive to propositional learning involving
stimuli that have never been directly paired (e.g., De Houwer,
2006b; Gast & De Houwer, 2012). Similarly, propositional and
associative learning influence the behavioral outcomes obtained
on both direct and indirect procedures (Whitfield & Jordan, 2009).
Taken together, these findings suggest that no procedure provides
a ‘‘process-pure’’ picture of the mental construct of interest or the
conditions of processing. Rather, for mechanistically orientated
researchers, the behavior obtained on such tasks reflects the joint6 For cognitive mechanistic researchers an outcome generated by a measure-
ment procedure is often defined as ‘‘implicit’’ when it is assumed to be causally
produced by a psychological attribute or construct that operates under one or more
of the conditions of automaticity. Consequently, different procedures may produce
effects that are ‘‘implicit’’ in different ways depending on (i) how their task-specific
properties co-vary with the different operating conditions of automaticity and (ii)
according to the automaticity features that characterize the metal process brought
to bear within that measurement context (see De Houwer & Moors, 2010).contribution of multiple mental processes that may be character-
ized by different features of automatic or controlled processing.
3.4. Procedural properties (construct irrelevant)
At the same time, the behavioral outcomes obtained on
indirect procedures may also be governed by properties of the
measure that are independent of the mental construct under
investigation. For tasks involving a block structure and alternating
response options (such as the IAT) stimulus-response compat-
ibility (De Houwer, 2001), task switching (Klauer & Mierke, 2005),
figure-ground asymmetry (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004), recod-
ing (Rothermund, Teige-Mocigemba, Gast, & Wentura, 2009), and
block order (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007) may influence not
only the absolute size but potentially the rank order of obtained
effects. Likewise, intentionally rating the primes instead of the
targets (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2012), attention to category member-
ship (Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, & Deutsch, 2010), length of
stimulus onset asynchrony and backward checking strategies
represent sources of construct irrelevant variance on priming
tasks (see Wentura & Degner, 2010 for a detailed discussion).7
More generally, the absence of a non-arbitrary zero point (Blanton
& Jaccard, 2006), ability to exert strategic control over the
behavioral effect (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005) as well as individual
differences in cognitive ability have been shown to influence the
findings obtained from a number of different indirect procedures
(see Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, & Sherman, 2010). Consequently,
task-specific properties that characterize one indirect procedure
but are absent from another may explain why different tasks
sometimes show opposite or alternative outcomes for theoreti-
cally comparable manipulations (Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009).
Overall, these findings provide further evidence that the effects
obtained from direct and indirect procedures do not provide a
one-to-one correspondence with the mental constructs that they
are designed to assess. Rather the unique constellation of proper-
ties that characterize a procedure will dictate what combination
of operating processes and conditions will be brought to bear in
the measurement context, as well as the potential sources of
systematic error variance that mediate between those processes
and the observed outcome.
3.5. Conclusion
In short, themechanistic approach has guided the study of implicit
cognition for well over 20 years now, shaping the questions asked,
methodologies devised and theoretical interpretation offered. The
success of this enterprise is evident in the widespread adoption of
these methods and theories across a diverse spectrum of research
domains, including health psychology (Wiers et al., 2010), consumer
psychology (Perkins & Forehand, 2010), forensic psychology
(Snowden, Craig, & Gray, 2011) and clinical psychology (Teachman,
Cody, & Clerkin, 2010). However, as Hayes (2004) notes ‘‘when a
discipline is markedly successful, it tends to continue in the same
direction for a time without a serious examination of its assumptions
because adherents have interesting work to do and rewards for doing
that work. Eventually, however, these assumptions begin to be
examined’’. Consistent with this notion, a number of authors have7 The discovery of method related variance on IAT effects has led to the
emergence of a second generation of IAT alternatives that aim to circumvent the
block structure of the task and its relativistic nature. Examples include the Single
Block IAT (Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, & Rothermund, 2008), Recoding Free IAT
(Rothermund et al., 2009) and the Sorting Paired Features Task (Bar-Anan, Nosek,
& Vianello, 2009). Equally, a number of strategies have also been devised to reduce
method variance on sematic and evaluative priming tasks (see Wentura & Degner,
2010).
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logical research, mechanism is subject to a number of challenges
at the measurement and conceptual levels (Borsboom, Mellenbergh,
& van Heerden, 2004; Chisea, 1994; De Houwer, 2011).4. Challenges facing the mechanistic approach
As we have seen, applying the mechanistic framework to
behavioral causation involves postulating hypothetical constructs
that mediate between environment and behavior. This approach
is immediately complicated by the fact that these constructs are
independent of the physical system that generates them—yet
they are assumed to interact with it. Consequently, their avail-
ability for direct manipulation is severely restricted. Mechanistic
researchers have attempted to square this circle by treating the
behavioral outcome obtained on a measurement procedure (e.g.,
IAT effect) as equivalent to the presence of the assumed construct
of interest (e.g., mental associations in memory). However, this
analytic strategy is problematic for one important reason: the use
of behavior as a proxy for mental constructs serves to conflate the
event that must be explained (i.e., behavior) with the concept
used to explain that event (i.e., the mental construct), and in
doing so violates a core feature of scientifically acceptable
explanations (see De Houwer, 2011 for a detailed discussion).
Indeed, the use of behavioral proxies appears to unleash a
Pandora’s Box of complications for mechanistic research and
theory in general.
One the one hand, the correspondence between behavior and
its underlying construct requires an inferential leap that is open
to potential error. For instance, any behavioral effect that can be
produced by a second mental construct in the absence of the
originally proposed construct results in that effect becoming an
insufficient basis on which to formulate firm conclusions about
the originally proposed construct. This is an important issue given
that variations in a mental construct do not necessarily corre-
spond to variations in a behavioral outcome—the latter may be
produced by other construct relevant (e.g. other mental pro-
cesses) or construct irrelevant factors (e.g., procedural properties).
To illustrate, consider evidence supporting the idea that IAT and
priming effects can be generated in the absence of any associative
pairings between stimuli (Gast & De Houwer, 2012). Such findings
introduce concerns about whether automatic responding is the
product of the originally proposed construct (associations) or an
additional construct (propositions). At the same time, and as
noted above, performance on any measurement procedure cannot
provide a one-to-one correspondence with the construct it is
designed to capture. Rather, the specific constellation of construct
relevant and irrelevant features of the task will mediate the link
between the assumed construct and the obtained behavior.
‘‘Needless to say, if effects that are driven by alternative sources
of variance are misattributed to the psychological construct a
procedure was designed to assess, theorizing about that construct
can be seriously distorted’’ (Gawronski, LeBel, Peters, & Banse,
2009, p. 370). In other words, theoretical claims about underlying
mental constructs and their properties are weakened in any
situation that introduces uncertainty about the bi-conditional
relation between behavior and the construct of interest (see
Borsboom et al., 2004).
On the other hand, treating a specific mental construct as a
necessary precondition for a behavioral effect may also result in
empirical myopia and impede scientific progress within a given
research area. For instance, the a priori assumption that implicit
cognition is fundamentally associative in nature has become so
woven into the fabric of this research area that it is often treated
as an immutable truism that no longer requires investigation.Consequently, the opportunity for novel theoretical and metho-
dological expansion that deviates from this position is often
hampered. Indeed, the constraining effect of such an approach
is evident in the fact that only now, after more than 20 years, the
role of associations in implicit cognition has been subject to
challenge (see Hughes et al., 2011 for a detailed treatment).
Finally, rather than promoting a convergence towards a coherent,
overarching and ‘‘Unified Theory of Cognition’’ (see Garcia-Marques &
Ferreira, 2011) the ‘‘behavior-as-proxy’’ approach has facilitated the
emergence of an ever growing number of mentalistic (and often
dichotomous) theories about narrow empirical phenomena. This
approach seems to offer little means of selecting from between these
alternative constructs. In the context of implicit cognition, for
example, models are typically evaluated based on their ability to
account for the domain of behavioral outcomes obtained as well as
their ability to predict future behavior. Nevertheless, in situations
where a number of alternative theories – each postulating different
mental mechanisms – are broadly similar in their predictive and
heuristic value, there appears to be no way of selecting one theory
from another. In such cases, debates between competing positions
cannot be resolved on empirical grounds, because any finding
predicted by one account can be reinterpreted by the other (see
Schwarz & Bohner, 2001). While parsimony may be called upon as an
additional selection criterion it is not without its own controversies
(Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009).
Although researchers may be fully aware of the drawbacks in
treating behavior as a proxy for mental constructs, they might
continue to do so if they believe that it is the only means to study
complex behaviors such as language and cognition. Critically,
however, mechanism is only one among a number of philosophi-
cal frameworks that scientists can draw upon to guide their
research activity. In what follows we outline a pragmatic and
non-dualistic alternative – functional contextualism – and illus-
trate how it equips (implicit cognition) researchers with a means
to circumvent many of the challenges outlined above.5. A functional approach to psychological science
While various forms of behaviorism have emerged over the last
hundred years, the most empirically and theoretically productive
contemporary branch is that of contextual behavioral science (CBS;
Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Wilson, 2012). This intellectual position
is founded on an intensely pragmatic and contextual philosophy of
science known as functional contextualism (Biglan & Hayes, 1996;
Hayes & Brownstein, 1986) which, similar to any world-view, is
characterized by a number of pre-analytic assumptions. First, this
approach adopts a single scientific goal; to understand, predict and
influence behavior with scope (explain a comprehensive range of
behaviors across a variety of situations), precision (applying a
restricted set of principles to any event) and depth (cohere across
analytical levels and domains such as biology, psychology, and
anthropology). What differentiates this approach from mechanism
is that it adopts an exclusively functional epistemology. Instead of
locating behavioral causation in the mind, scientific analysis is
focused on the functional relations between the (past and present)
environment and behavior that unfold across both time and context.
Consequently, any appeal to or a priori assumptions about hypothe-
tical mental constructs or their causal agency in producing behavioral
change is omitted. There is no mechanistic requirement for spatially
and temporally contiguous events to mediate the relationship
between environment and behavior. Rather, behavior is defined as
an on-going ‘‘act-in-context’’ that always occurs within and in
response to a current and historical context (Pepper, 1942; Hayes,
1993). This context can ‘‘project outward spatially to include the
entire universey.backward in time infinitely to include the remotest
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quence’’ (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986, p. 178). Given that the temporal
and spatial parameters of an environmental context can vary drama-
tically, functional researchers adopt a ‘‘pragmatic truth criterion’’ that
qualifies the success, meaning or validity of a scientific analysis in
terms of its ability to achieve prediction and influence over the
behavior of interest.
A second assumption of functional contextualism as applied to
behavior is that the environmental context can not only extend
backwards or forwards in space and time but also may refer to the
‘‘internal environment’’ that occurs privately inside the person’s
skin or the ‘‘external environment’’ that takes place publicly
outside the skin. Although early methodological behaviorists such
as Watson (1924) focused exclusively on public behavior and
excluded private events from legitimate analysis, contemporary
functional researchers simply arrange behavior along a conti-
nuum from public (e.g. walking, painting) to private (e.g. thinking,
feeling, and remembering) (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986; Skinner,
1945). This strategy is adopted given that prediction and influ-
ence constitute the primary goal of analysis. To illustrate this
point more clearly, consider the example of a mental link
between two associations in memory. Although such a mental
or non-physical event may be seen as the cause of a particular
behavior (performance on an IAT) it is not open to direct
manipulation. In contrast, explaining a behavioral outcome in
terms of environmental events such as antecedents and conse-
quences provides the researcher with an opportunity to directly
influence the causal factors that govern behavior and its change.
Consequently, when scientific analysis allows for the use of
mental constructs that cannot be directly manipulated, prediction
appears to emerge as the primary focus rather than prediction-
and-influence (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). While prediction
alone is satisfactory within the mechanistic framework, it is
unsatisfactory when measured against the goals of functional
contextualism. Thus by recasting emotion, (implicit) cognition
and other mental constructs as a tendency to publicly or privately
behave in a certain way within a certain context, scientific activity
shifts from the search for mental processes and conditions
towards identifying the environmental variables that govern
different patterns of behavior. Put differently, functional research-
ers treat private events as subject to the same principles and
contingencies as their public counterparts, and thus (in principle)
open them up to both prediction and influence.8
Finally, functional researchers seek to abstract out basic
findings into general and overarching ‘‘behavioral principles’’ that
demonstrate high precision, scope and depth (e.g., the principles
of reinforcement, punishment, and stimulus generalization). Such
principles are inductive in nature, built from the ‘‘bottom up’’ and
‘‘apply across a broad array of topographically distinct behaviors
of varying complexity while maintaining coherence and parsi-
mony’’ (Levin & Hayes, 2009, p. 6). When researchers seek to
explain a range of behavioral interactions using a set of inter-
related behavioral principles, functional theories emerge. Such
theories do not postulate mediating mental constructs or their
interaction with other constructs when explaining behavior and
its change. Instead they describe and seek to explain observed
regularities in the functional relations between environmental
events and behavior. One functional theory that attempts to
account for a wide variety of private and public behaviors using8 Although predicting the causal impact of mental events on subsequent
behavior represents the sine qua non of mechanism as applied to psychology, this
endeavor is not without its own difficulties. In particular, prediction requires that
the researcher make a priori assumptions about how observable physical events
relate to non-observable mental constructs, and these assumptions are often
fraught with complications (see De Houwer, 2011 for a detailed discussion).only a handful of inter-related principles is Relational Frame
Theory (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). In the sections
that follow the basic features of this functional account will first
be outlined. Thereafter, we examine how it has recently been
applied to the study of implicit cognition, and in particular, how it
has facilitated theoretical, methodological and empirical progress
within this research area.
5.1. Relational frame theory
At its core, RFT argues that humans and non-humans alike can
learn to relate stimuli (i.e., respond to one stimulus in terms of
another) through a number of different learning processes, such
as respondent learning, operant learning, stimulus generalization
and discrimination. In the case of respondent and operant learn-
ing, the organism learns to discriminate the relation between
stimuli based on a directly trained contingency that is previously
encountered in its learning history. For instance, animals can be
trained to form relations between stimuli based on their (non-
arbitrary) physical properties (Harmon, Strong, & Pasnak, 1982;
Reese, 1968) or relate arbitrary stimuli such as abstract shapes
and symbols based on their shared functions (Vaughan, 1988).
Stimulus generalization and discrimination also require a prior
history of relating but with the additional requirement that the
previously encountered stimuli bear a physical similarity to the
stimulus being generalized or discriminated. In each of the above
cases, relating is based on a direct history of training and often
involves a specific temporal order, or formal relationship,
between the to-be-related stimuli (see Hayes et al., 2001 for a
detailed discussion).
In contrast, RFT argues that humans are not limited to direct
contingency learning but can also relate stimuli to one another in
the absence of any direct reinforcement for doing so. Put another
way, while non-human animals appear to be largely restricted to
relating stimuli through the use of direct contingencies and based
on their formal properties, humans demonstrate the additional
ability to derive novel, untrained and bi-directional relations
between stimuli. RFT proposes that this behavior (termed arbi-
trarily applicable relational responding) is an overarching type of
operant response that is learned early on in our development
through interactions with the verbal community (Hayes et al.,
2001; Rehfeldt & Barnes-Holmes, 2009) and is defined according
to the presence of three core properties, termed mutual entail-
ment, combinatorial entailment, and the transformation of sti-
mulus function.9
To illustrate these three properties imagine that an individual
is taught, through either direct contingency learning or instruc-
tion, that one stimulus (A) is the same as a second stimulus
(B) and B is the same as C. In this scenario, mutual entailment
refers to the bi-directional relation that emerges between two
stimuli in the absence of explicit training. In other words, if A is
the same as B, then humans will also derive a second relation
(that B is the same as A) without any additional training.
Combinatorial entailment refers to the functional relations that
emerge between two or more mutually entailed stimuli. Thus, if A
is bigger than as B and B is bigger than C, then humans will
spontaneously derive that A is bigger than C as well as C is smaller
than A. Finally, and perhaps most important within the context of
the current work, once stimuli have been mutually or9 While humans are phylogenetically prepared to learn associations between
stimuli (respondent learning) and to be governed by the consequences of their
actions (operant learning) the ability to derive the relation between stimuli
appears to be a learned behavior that emerges through a history of generalized
operant responding (for a detailed treatment of how derived relational responding
emerges see To¨rneke, 2010).
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functions may be transformed through that relation from one
stimulus to another. Imagine for instance that an aversive func-
tion is established for stimulus A (e.g., a shock), and A is then
related as equivalent to a number of other stimuli (e.g., B, C, D).
Given appropriate contextual cues, these other stimuli will also
acquire the negative functions of A despite never having been
directly paired with a shock (e.g., Dougher, Augustson, Markham,
Greenway, & Wulfert, 1994).
According to RFT the particular way in which stimuli are
related, as well as psychological function(s) transformed through
those relations, is determined by two forms of contextual control.
On the one hand, humans can learn to relate stimuli in a vast
number of arbitrarily applicable ways, including relations of
equivalence (Cahill et al., 2007), similarity and opposition
(Dymond, Roche, Forsyth, Whelan, & Rhoden, 2008), hierarchy
(Gil, Luciano, Ruiz, & Valdivia-Salas, 2012), comparison (Vitale,
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Campbell, 2008), temporality
(O’Hora et al., 2008), and causality. Relational responding may
also include deictic or perspective-taking relations (McHugh,
Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2007). The contextual cues
that establish and indicate which type of relational responding
should be brought to bear on a particular situation are often
referred to as ‘‘Crels’’. On the other hand, a wide range of
psychological functions can be transformed through different
stimulus relations, including discriminative (Dougher et al.,
2007), affective (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, &
Luciano, 2004), approach (Gannon, Roche, Kanter, Forsyth,
& Linehan, 2011), avoidance (Roche, Kanter, Brown, Dymond, &
Fogarty, 2008), sexual (Roche, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Barnes-
Holmes, & McGeady, 2000), self-discrimination (Dymond &
Barnes, 1996) and extinction functions (Dougher et al., 1994).
The contextual cues that specify which functions should be
transformed through such relations are termed ‘‘Cfuncs’’.
Over the past 20 years RFT has emerged as a coherent,
parsimonious and progressive functional theory that has gained
empirical momentum and stimulated a rapidly growing body of
research (see Dymond & Roche, in press), clinical applications
(Gaudiano, 2011; Rehfeldt & Barnes-Holmes, 2009), and concep-
tual controversy (Gross & Fox, 2009). Derived relational respond-
ing is argued to represent the fundamental behavioral unit
underpinning a wide range of psychological phenomena including
language and cognition (Hayes et al., 2001), intelligence (O’Toole
& Barnes-Holmes, 2009; Cassidy, Roche, & Hayes, 2011) perspec-
tive taking and the self (McHugh & Stewart, 2012). As we shall
see, the basic concept of derived stimulus relating in combination
with the properties of relational complexity, coherence and
derivation may also equip functional researchers with the con-
ceptual tools necessary to understand, predict and influence
implicit cognition.10 Note that the REC model is not distinct from RFT but hierarchically related
to it. In other words, the relationship between RFT and the REC model is the same
as the relationship between RFT and the model of analogical reasoning offered in
Chapter 4, or the model of problem solving offered in Chapter 5, or the model of
rule-governed behavior offered in Chapter 6 of the volume by Hayes et al. (2001).
Indeed, if a second edition of the volume were to be published in the future it
would contain a chapter on the REC model. This serves to underscore that RFT
remains a work-in-progress and no volume or set of volumes should be seen as
offering the final or complete account of human language and cognition. Rather,
RFT is a constantly evolving analytic-abstractive position that feeds into, and is in
turn fed by, its application to a diverse range of behavioral phenomena.6. A functional approach to the study of implicit cognition
While mutual, combinatorial entailment and transformation of
function are the defining features of derived stimulus relating, two
emergent properties of this type of responding are also worth noting
in the context of the current paper. First, stimulus relations can vary
in their complexity and be arranged along a continuum from low to
high. Stimuli can be related to one another in a vast number of ways,
from simple mutually entailed relations between single stimuli to
combinatorial relations involving multiple stimuli, to the relating of
stimulus relations to other relations (often termed relational net-
works) to the complex relating of entire relational networks to other
networks. Not only can stimulus relations vary in their complexity
but so too can the type and number of functions transformedaccording too those relations. For example, mutually or combinato-
rially entailed relations between stimuli may involve single functions
being transformed based on a relation between one stimulus and
another, whereas the relating of complex networks of relations to
other networks may involve a vast array of stimulus functions being
modified in accordance with those relations.
Second, relations can not only vary in their complexity but also
in the degree to which they have been previously derived in the
past. As noted above, derivation refers to the finding that once a
set of relations between stimuli is directly trained, a number of
additional untrained relations also emerge and allow for the
transformation of function. To illustrate, consider a situation
where a participant has just been trained to select B when given
A and C when given B. Thereafter, and upon testing, a series of
untrained relations are evident (e.g., selecting A when given C or C
when given A). In this learning situation, we argue that the first
instance in which the person derives the relation between A and C
be defined as a ‘‘high derivation’’ response given that the history
of deriving that particular response is minimal. Alternatively,
imagine that the same person is then provided with an ever
increasing number of opportunities to derive the relation
between those same stimuli. Across each of these successive
derivation opportunities the resulting response may come to be
increasingly defined as involving ‘‘low’’ levels of derivation. Note
that, according to RFT, derivation may well decline, with repeated
instances, even when some form of programmed reinforcement is
not provided for each derived response because derivation itself is
‘‘rewarded’’ by contacting increased relational coherence (see
Hayes, Fox, Gifford, Wilson, Barnes-Holmes, & Healy, 2001,
pp. 42–43). We will revisit this issue later in the paper.
In other words, and similar to relational complexity, the
degree to which a response can be characterized as derived may
also be arranged along a continuum from low to high. While
complexity and derivation can be independently manipulated,
they should not be conceptualized as mutually exclusive, but
simply properties of relational responding that will be more or
less evident in different contexts. In what follows, we draw upon
these two response properties in order to explain (a) the con-
vergent and divergent patterns of behavior observed on direct and
indirect procedures, (b) why different classes of behavior are
better at predicting certain outcomes than others and (c) to
distinguish between the behaviors that are frequently divided
into the domains referred to as implicit versus explicit. Towards
this end, we first outline the core assumptions of this account,
known as the Relational Elaboration and Coherence (REC) model,
and then consider the benefits and challenges associated with
explaining different patterns of behavior in this way.107. The relational elaboration and coherence (REC) model
A central premise of the REC model is that the behavioral
outcome obtained on a measurement procedure will reflect an
interaction between the individual’s learning history with respect
to the targeted relation(s) and the specific features of the context
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Fig. 2. Behavior causation according to the functional (contextual) approach. The
individual’s learning history with respect to the targeted relation interacts with
features of current context in producing behavior on a particular measurement
procedure.
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process of arbitrarily applicable relational responding can be
carved into different patterns of behavior that vary in their
relative levels of complexity and derivation. Before continuing it
should be noted that this functional account is characterized by
two core assumptions that distinguish it from the mental models
of implicit cognition discussed previously.
First, a mechanistic account of ‘‘automatic’’ and ‘‘controlled’’
behavior as the product of singular, dual or multiple mental
processes operating exclusively or in interaction is substituted for
a purely functional one. The REC model replaces the notion of
causal forces or agency (mental constructs) with causal relations
between behavior and environment. This reciprocal relation
between behavior and environment can occur in a variety of
ways, from direct learning contingencies established via respon-
dent or operant learning, stimulus generalization and discrimina-
tion as well as those governed via arbitrarily applicable relational
responding (e.g., instructions or inferences). Thus the probability
of a particular response being emitted, whether that response is a
button press on the IAT or the selection of a certain answer on a
racial attitudes questionnaire, will either increase or decrease
depending on the contingencies that governed similar responding
in the past. In short, the mechanistic requirement for mental
events to fill the spatial and temporal gaps between environment
and behavior is replaced by a selectionist account (e.g., Darwinian
natural selection) in which causation occurs over time and at a
distance (see Chisea, 1994). In doing so, the notion of (implicit)
cognition is emptied of any connotation of mediating forces or
agency above and beyond the functional relation between envir-
onment and behavior.11
Second, cognitive researchers often conceptualize the (mea-
surement) context as separate from the mental processes that are
hypothesized to cause behavior and thus of secondary interest
(e.g., Rydell & Gawronski, 2009). In direct contrast, and in-line
with RFT, the REC model treats the behavior obtained on a
measurement procedure as an on-going action that can only be
understood with respect to the historical and current context in
which it occurs. In other words, behavior always occurs within
some context. When a change in behavior is defined as differences
in the probability of a response due to interaction in and with the
environment, the context takes on a central explanatory role.
Thus for the REC model, the procedure – as a central feature of the
current context – is not a passive set of instructions on how to
generate a behavioral effect but rather an active explanatory
factor in understanding that effect. More precisely, the degree to
which different features of relational responding will be made
evident to the researcher will depend on the specific constellation
of conditions that characterize the context in which that behavior
is measured (see Fig. 2).
At this point it seems important to note that previous work on
the REC model suggested that responses defined as ‘‘automatic’’
or ‘‘implicit’’ frequently involve brief and immediate relational
responses (BIRRs) while their ‘‘explicit’’ or ‘‘controlled’’ counter-
parts involve extended and elaborated relational responding
(EERRs). These preliminary sketches of the model focused on
time as a means to distinguish the concept of BIRRs from EERRs,11 Note that while changes in behavior can refer to any somatic (e.g., button
press on an indirect procedure), autonomic (e.g., salivation) or neural action (e.g.,
electrical impulses in the brain) that results from interactions with the current or
historical context, functional researchers typically conceptualize behavior in terms
of the whole organism. Nevertheless and with respect to implicit cognition, a
number of (indirect) physiological procedures have been developed that focus on
particular features of the behaving organism, such as electromyography (e.g.,
Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes 2011), functional magnetic resonance imaging
(Hart et al., 2000), event related potentials (Ito et al., 2004), and skin conductance
(Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008).but of course other properties would seem to be important in
developing a more complete functional treatment of implicit
cognition (see De Houwer & Moors, in press). Indeed, the fore-
going arguments were never meant to be read as final or absolute
functional definitions of automatic versus controlled behavior. In
the following sections we focus on two additional properties of
relational responding that may also be important in understand-
ing implicit cognition; level of derivation and level of complexity
(as will become clear, however, the parameter of time cannot be
separated entirely from these two properties).
In keeping with a purely functional epistemology, the REC
model arranges responding along these two probabilistic and
graded continua, with behavior varying in degrees rather than in
kind. In doing so, the notion of two dichotomous classes of
‘‘automatic’’ versus ‘‘controlled’’ behavior that are independent
but mutually interactive is replaced with a more subtle discrimi-
nation between properties of arbitrarily applicable relational
responding based on time, and more critically in the current
article, levels of complexity and derivation. When viewed in this
way, relational responding can be divided into four broad, over-
arching categories (see Fig. 3). These categories should not be
rarefied as ‘‘static’’ or ‘‘permanent’’ but simply viewed as con-
venient visual illustrations for behaviors characterized by differ-
ent levels of complexity and derivation. Likewise, the labels BIRRs
and EERRs are not ‘‘static’’ or ‘‘permanent’’ things, constructs or
mechanisms. They too are convenient labels that orientate the
researcher towards a particular behavioral domain (implicit
cognition), and in particular, properties of relational responding
that seem important in understanding, predicting and influencing
those behaviors. As will become clear, BIRRs often involveR
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Fig. 3. Relational responding carved into four different categories as a function of
the complexity and level of derivation that characterize the response.
12 Although the IAT and priming tasks were primarily designed to target low
complexity coordination relations, several researchers have obtained indirect
evidence for other types of relational responding on these procedures, including
opposition responding (e.g., ‘‘negation’’; Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, &
Russin, 2000), deictic relating (Olson & Fazio, 2004), and evaluative relating
(Fo¨rderer & Unkelbach, 2012).
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EERRs involve relatively higher levels of these respective response
properties. In the following sections we explore the possible
features of each of these different response patterns in greater
detail.
7.1. Low complexity low derivation responding
Given that relational responses, like all behaviors, unfold
across time, the REC model proposes that (all things being equal)
more complex responses may take additional time and be emitted
with less accuracy relative to their less complex counterparts. To
illustrate, consider the concept of nodal distance which refers to
the number of nodes that link any two stimuli in a set of trained
conditional relations. Interestingly, the time taken to respond in
accordance with an equivalence relation increases and the accu-
racy of those responses decreases when the nodal distance within
the equivalence class grows (Fields & Moss, 2007; Kennedy, 1991;
Tomanari, Sidman, Rubio, & Dube, 2006; Wang, McHugh, &
Whelan, 2012). Critically, however, when other relations above
and beyond equivalence are involved, the complexity of a relation
will be dictated not only by nodal distance but the number and
type of relations involved (O’Hora, Roche, Barnes-Holmes, &
Smeets, 2002; Steele & Hayes, 1991). Indeed, much work now
indicates that as the number and type of relations increase the
speed and accuracy of responding decreases relative to responses
that are at lower levels of complexity (see Barnes-Holmes et al.,
2005; Hayes & Bissett, 1998; Vitale et al., 2008; Reilly, Whelan, &
Barnes-Holmes, 2005).
At the same time, the extent to which a response has been
derived in the past will also influence its probability of being
emitted quickly and accuracy in the future. For instance, the
speed with which participants derive coordination, comparative
and opposition relations becomes significantly faster with each
successive opportunity to derive (O’Hora et al., 2002; Roche,
Linehan, Ward, Dymond, & Rehfeldt, 2004; Steele & Hayes,
1991). Likewise, an overarching history of derivation facilitates
the emergence of more accurate relational performances within
and across stimulus sets (Bentall, Dickins, & Fox, 1993; Healy
Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2000; Roche et al., 2004; Sidman,
1994; Saunders & Green, 1999; Wang et al., 2012; Wulfert &
Hayes, 1988). When taken together, it appears that the complex-
ity of a relational response, as well as the degree to which it has
been derived in the past, influences the probability that it will be
emitted with speed and accuracy in the future. In particular,
responses characterized by an extensive history of derivation and
low levels of complexity appear to be emitted with relatively
greater speed/accuracy than their more complex and less derived
counterparts.
Insofar as the REC model is correct, then contexts that impose
time and accuracy restrictions should increase the likelihood that
responses will be low in both complexity and derivation. Over the
past two decades, this methodological requirement for partici-
pants to emit low complexity relational responses under time
pressure has been foundational in the development of many if not
most indirect procedures (see Gawronski & De Houwer, in press).
Indeed, while the original IAT and priming tasks – as well as their
second generation variants – arrange the measurement context in
a variety of ways, they each pair stimuli in close temporal or
spatial proximity and require a low complexity (coordination)
response to be emitted quickly. In such cases, speeded perfor-
mances are used as a means to infer relatively simple relational
responses between different classes of stimuli. What is important
to note here is that by arranging the measurement context to
primarily target coordination relations, the IAT and priming tasks
are effectively restricted in the complexity of the learning historythat they can capture. Put simply, while the individual may have a
rich and complex history of relating with respect to the phenom-
ena of interest, the vast majority of indirect procedures are
intrinsically designed to target only the most rudimentary fea-
tures of that history.12
Throughout much of the past 20 years mechanistic researchers
have labeled low complexity (and we would argue low deriva-
tion) relational responses as ‘‘associative’’ and deployed them as
evidence for the operation of mental associations in memory
(Hughes et al., 2011). Importantly, however, the REC model
argues that such responses are not associative at all—rather they
are entirely relational in nature. According to this perspective,
given a sufficient history of learning, and a measurement context
designed to capture those relations, the behavioral effects
obtained on indirect procedures should reflect other relational
responses above and beyond coordination. In principle, BIRRs can
involve any relationship between stimuli, such as opposition,
hierarchy, spatial, temporal or comparative relations. Although
the speed and accuracy of these responses will presumably vary
in accordance with the levels of complexity and derivation of the
targeted relation, there is no a priori reason why any type of
relation should not be emitted quickly and accurately. One
implication of viewing behavior in this way is that a non-
associative indirect procedure is not only possible but quickly
becomes necessary. Recently, a methodology has emerged from
the functional literature that is capable of targeting relations that
are low in complexity and derivation—the Implicit Relational
Assessment Procedure (IRAP; see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes,
Stewart, & Boles, 2010).
7.1.1. The IRAP
Similar to other indirect procedures, the IRAP arranges the
measurement context in such a way as to place an individual’s
pre-experimentally established learning history into competition
with a response contingency deemed inconsistent with that
history of responding. Unlike any other indirect procedures
developed however, the task is capable of targeting different
types of stimulus relations (e.g. opposition, comparison) at
differing levels of complexity (e.g., those that involve single
stimuli or entire relational networks). To illustrate, consider
Roddy, Stewart, and Barnes-Holmes’ (2011) study examining brief
and immediate relational responding towards overweight and
average weight individuals. Participants received an IRAP on
which a target stimulus (e.g., picture of an overweight or average
weight person) was presented along with a label stimulus
(‘‘Good’’ or ‘‘Bad’’) and two relational response options (‘‘Similar’’
and ‘‘Opposite’’). During blocks of trials deemed consistent with a
‘‘pro-slim/anti-fat’’ learning history participants were required to
emit the following relational responses: Slim–Good–Same, Slim–
Bad–Opposite, Fat–Good–Opposite, Fat–Bad–Same. In contrast,
blocks of trials deemed inconsistent with a ‘‘pro-slim/anti-fat’’
learning history required a reverse pattern of responding (i.e.,
Slim–Bad–Same, Slim–Good–Opposite, Fat–Bad–Opposite, Fat–
Good–Same). In other words, by presenting specific label and
target stimuli together on a certain trial and requiring a particular
response to be emitted quickly and accurately, the IRAP targets
four separate stimulus relations independently of one another. In
the above example, these stimulus relations were Good–Slim,
Good–Fat, Bad–Slim and Bad–Fat. The difference in time taken to
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Fig. 4. Learning history brought to bear in a measurement procedure as a function
of relational complexity and levels of derivation. The curved lines indicate that as
levels of relational complexity and derivation changes, different measurement
procedures will be differentially sensitive to targeting these relations.
13 Within the implicit cognition literature, higher complexity/low derivation
responding appears to have been mechanistically interpreted as the ‘‘contaminat-
ing’’ influence of higher order cognitive processes (i.e., propositions) on indirect
procedures—which are typically viewed as targeting lower level processes such as
associations (e.g., De Houwer, 2008).
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the IRAP effect – is assumed to provide an index of the strength or
probability of these various relations.
Interestingly, participants in the Roddy et al. study showed a
significant IRAP effect for the Good–Slim and Bad–Slim relations,
but no effect for the Good–Fat or Bad–Fat relations, indicating a
positive relational bias towards average weight people but the
absence of a negative bias towards their overweight counterparts.
Furthermore, while performance on the IRAP was correlated with
an analogous IAT, only the IRAP was correlated with participants’
physiological activity registered via electromyography (EMG).
Similar to the IRAP, the EMG measure indicated a pro-slim but
neutral-fat response pattern. In other words, and consistent with
the REC model, relational responses above and beyond coordina-
tion can be emitted with speed and precision. Across a growing
number of studies and stimulus domains, BIRRs involving com-
parative (Power, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart,
2009), opposition (Cullen, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, &
Stewart, 2009) and distinction relations have been obtained
(Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). Moreover, IRAP perfor-
mances have been found to correlate with those on the IAT and
offer comparable if not better predictive validity when food
related behaviors (Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes, &
Stewart, 2010), relational biases towards body-size (Roddy,
Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010) and sexual orientation
(Timmins, Barnes-Holmes, & Cullen, 2012) are assessed. Brief
and immediate relational responding has also been found to
correlate with a number of physiological (Roddy et al., 2011)
and neurological indices (Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, Barnes-
Holmes, & Stewart, 2008) in addition to other indirect procedures
such as the Stroop task (Carpenter, Martinez, Vadhan, Barnes-
Holmes, & Nunes, 2012) (for a detailed review see Hughes &
Barnes-Holmes, in press).
Before continuing it should be noted that responses we
suspect predominantly involve frames of coordination – such as
the IAT and priming effects – will likely be emitted with relatively
greater speed and accuracy than responses characterized by
higher levels of relational complexity (e.g., IRAP effects that are
likely based on comparison or distinction). More precisely, and
given its centrality in natural language use, the generalized
operant of coordination is likely at a higher probability relative
to other relational operants and thus, in the absence of alternative
controlling stimuli, may be emitted with a high degree of speed
and accuracy (see Hayes et al., 2001). This is not say that
coordination relations will necessarily always be the most ‘‘BIRR
like’’ type of BIRR—rather like any functional interaction between
the individual and his or her environment due consideration has
to be given to the learning history and current context. For
example, providing a long and well established history of opposi-
tion (‘‘negation’’) relating across multiple contexts would likely
result in such responses being emitted with greater speed and
accuracy relative to their coordination counterparts (e.g., Deutsch,
Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009; Kawakami et al.,
2000; although see Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack,
2008).
To summarize, the REC model argues that performances on
indirect procedures typically capture relational responses that
are low in both complexity and derivation (see Fig. 4). The
behavioral effect obtained from such tasks reflects an interaction
between the (a) history of learning with respect to the targeted
relation as well as (b) the constellation of features that character-
ize the measurement context. While a majority of indirect effects
seem to be designed to capture coordination relations under time
and accuracy restrictions, recent evidence suggests that other
types of relational responses can also be emitted quickly and
accurately.7.2. Higher complexity low derivation
Although the previous section focused exclusively on
responses that were low in their complexity and derivation,
a more complicated picture emerges when these two factors
interact. As we have seen, the REC model arranges relational
responses along a complexity continuum, with the lower end of
this scale occupied by BIRRs involving coordination (Over-weight–
Bad/True), comparison (Coke–Pepsi/Better–than), distinction (Arabic–
Dangerous/False) opposition (Black–Bad/Opposite), or, in principle,
any other relational frame. As one travels further along this
continuum the complexity of the related stimuli increases from
single relations to those involving multiple relations and relational
networks. These relations may be characterized by relatively higher
levels of complexity yet still have been derived many times in the
individual’s learning history. Consequently, while these responses
may be slower and less accurate compared to their low complexity/
derivation counterparts, they should still be emitted with relative
speed and precision.13
Consistent with this notion, Nicholson and Barnes-Holmes (2012)
recently explored brief and immediate relational responding towards
a variety of disgusting items, but using self-referential statements as
target stimuli. During the IRAP participants were required to look at a
picture of a disgust eliciting stimulus and then confirm or deny a
statement that involves a complex deictic relational response (e.g.,
‘‘I am disgusted’’, ‘‘I need to look away’’). In effect, participants were
asked to relate a picture to a relational network in terms of whether
or not the network coordinated with a self-discriminated behavioral
event. In total, two separate IRAPs were completed; one targeting so-
called ‘‘propensity towards disgust’’ when confronted with revolting
items (e.g., ‘‘I am disgusted’’) and a second assessing so-called
‘‘sensitivity’’ to the same stimuli (e.g., ‘‘I need to look away’’). Not only
did separate and significant IRAP effects emerge for these two types
of relational responses, but they predicted entirely different beha-
vioral outcomes on a set of behavioral approach tasks and self-report
procedures. What is interesting here is that different relational
responses (i.e., ‘‘I am disgusted’’ versus ‘‘I need to look away’’) gave
rise to distinct outcomes on direct and indirect procedures—despite
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pictorial stimuli on the two IRAPs.
Broadly similar findings have also been obtained when other
higher complexity BIRRs have been subject to inquiry, such as self-
referential statements about cocaine (e.g., ‘‘With cocaine I am popular’’)
in a sample of drug users (Carpenter et al., 2012), self and body-size
biases in a mixed group of patients with Anorexia Nervosa (Parling,
Cernvall, Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, & Ghaderi, 2012), self-esteem in a
prisoner population (Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, &
Stewart, 2009) as well as emotional responding for high versus low
depressed individuals (Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, in press; see also
Nosek & Hansen, 2008). Although each of these studies seems to
involve higher complexity relations than those discussed in the
previous section, it is likely that these relations have been derived
many times in the past given that they were emitted with relative
speed and accuracy. Nevertheless, while these higher complexity
relations may be, on average, at low derivation, relative differences in
derivation levels across individuals may contribute to distinct out-
comes on indirect procedures. For instance, it may be the case that
‘‘known groups’’ studies assessing the same level of relational
complexity are in fact highlighting, amongst other factors, differences
in the degree to which those responses have been derived in the past
(e.g., Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, in press; Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes,
in press).
As we continue further along the complexity continuum, the
REC model predicts there will be some notional point beyond
which the targeted relation will be too complex for reaction time
based indirect procedures such as the IAT, IRAP and priming to
capture. Although extensively deriving a relation may allow for
the ensuing response to be emitted with relative speed and
accuracy, this is nevertheless contingent on the complexity of
the relation involved. Imagine, for example, a student of logic who
has committed an extended syllogism to memory many times.
After practicing this syllogism on one hundred occasions, she may
be able to articulate the argument relatively quickly and accu-
rately. However, the probability of the entire logical argument
being emitted within a matter of milliseconds is relatively low
(perhaps even impossible). Instead, this particular behavioral
event will likely take place over an extended period of seconds
(or even minutes) and thus fall outside the speeded response
requirements implemented by many indirect procedures.
Stated more precisely then, when a response involves a complex
interaction between multiple relational networks, increasing the level
of derivation may not reduce the spatio-temporal properties of that
response to the point that it can be effectively captured by time-based
indirect procedures. Rather, an alternative methodology is needed
that arranges the measurement context in such a way as to capture
these extended and elaborated relational responses (EERRs). In
particular, measurement contexts in which time is not a critical
factor (e.g., semantic differential scales, likert scales, interviews, and
focus groups) will likely allow for additional responses to occur
toward the stimulus itself or toward the initial responses to that
stimulus. More often than not, these direct procedures treat overt
verbal reports as functionally equivalent to the EERR under investiga-
tion. Consider, for example, the question ‘‘How do you feel about
Brazilians?’’ The ensuing response would presumably provide an
index of the person’s EERRs towards Brazilian people in general.
Importantly, such procedures are not restricted to the assessment of
ethnic stereotyping, but can target relational responding across a
wide variety of content domains (e.g., preferences, opinions, beliefs,
and values).7.2.1. The problem with EERRs
Although the outcomes obtained from direct tasks potentially
provide a more detailed insight into the individual’s learninghistory relative to their indirect counterparts, they have long been
recognized as susceptible to current contextual control in the
form of demand characteristics and impression management
(Holtgraves, 2004; Paulhus, 1989; although see Uziel, 2010). Put
simply, people may recognize their private content but fail to
report it, either because they do not endorse it, or because they
are concerned about the social consequences of doing so. Indeed
the ability for people to edit their overt responding in order to
correspond with overarching rules implemented by the verbal
community – or their own privately generated rules – serves to
reduce the predictive validity of direct procedures in many
domains (see Nosek et al., 2011). For instance, people are often
reluctant to self-report engagement with illegal or socially taboo
behaviors (Ames et al., 2007) or their affinity for violence when
seeking treatment (Polaschek, Bell, Calvert, & Takarangi, 2010).
Similarly, child sex offenders are hesitant to report their attrac-
tion to children yet differ in their brief and immediate relational
responding towards ‘‘children as sexual’’ compared to non-
offenders (Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, Gresswell, Hart, & Gore,
2009) and violent offenders with no sexual crimes towards
children (Brown, Gray, & Snowden, 2009).
The REC model suggests that rule governed behavior may provide
one explanation for why outcomes on direct procedures often lack
predictive validity as well as diverge from indirect procedures
assessing the same phenomena. According to this perspective, rules
modify or establish the psychological functions of events via a
transformation of functions that typically involve coordination, com-
parison, temporality and/or causality. They constitute a class of EERRs
that can be established by the individual themselves or the wider
verbal community and specify a contingency between antecedent,
behavioral and consequential events (see Ju & Hayes, 2008; To¨rneke,
2010; Whelan, Barnes-Holmes, & Dymond, 2006). Importantly, the
behavior or consequences specified by the rule need not have been
directly contacted by the individual in the past. What is necessary is a
history of relational responding, coupled with previous contact with
the consequences of rule following. Imagine, for example, you are
instructed that ‘‘public declarations that black people are bad are
typically punished by society in a variety of ways, such as being verbally
reprimanded, socially ostracized or imprisoned’’. This rule places you in
contact with a relational network that transforms the functions of the
stimuli within that network. In the above example, overt negative
evaluations of black people are related temporally and causally with a
particular class of aversive stimuli. Terms such as ‘‘punished by
society’’ alter the functions of behavior (i.e., making negative public
statements about black people), and the transformation of stimulus
functions provides these actions and contexts with some of the
features of the specified consequences (i.e., avoidance). As the person
responds in accordance with the rule, the coordination between the
rule and ‘‘the relations sustained among the specific events when the
rule is followed, provides an on-going source of control over
behavior’’ (Hayes et al., 2001, p. 107). Put simply, when a rule is
followed, events in the environment participating in that relational
network acquire verbal functions as specified by the rule. Thus if an
individual who has historically emitted discriminatory remarks about
black people stops doing so after encountering the above statement, it
would seem that their behavior is meaningfully rule-governed.
In regulating the behavior of its members, the verbal commu-
nity establishes and enforces a wide range of rules for appropriate
conduct, and this is often the case for classes of stimuli that are
relevant to ‘‘socially-sensitive’’ domains such as race, sexual
orientation, religion and politics. Importantly, however, these
rules may or may not correspond to the individual’s own history
of responding. It is also worth noting that people can understand
these rules and yet fail to follow them. Consider, for example, a
white woman with a history of relating black people with
negative stimuli who is asked to complete a questionnaire
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group. On the one hand, the women may disregard her prior
history of relating as the basis on which to respond and follow an
overarching rule operating within that context (e.g., report a lack
of racial bias). In this speculative example, verbal regulation of
behavior will likely result in a divergence between responses on
the questionnaire and her behavior towards black individuals in
general. On the other hand, the woman may ‘‘disregard the rule’’
in contexts where socially mediated punishment seems unlikely
(e.g. when talking to a friend who she knows shares her racial
biases) and respond in accordance with her prior history of
relating black people with negative stimuli. Within experimental
situations, contextual factors such as guarantees and evidence that
self-reports are anonymous, assessing the relational response unob-
trusively, or hiding the true intent of the question may lead to
responding that remains unaffected by rules pertaining to the social-
acceptability of expressing negative opinions about the stimuli, and
thus an increase in correspondence between direct measures and
future behavior may be observed (e.g., Devine, 1989; Fazio et al.,
1995). Likewise, soliciting responses from participants who believe
that the experimenter can readily identify deception may also serve
to increase correspondence across measures (e.g., ‘‘Bogus pipe-line’’;
Roese & Jamieson, 1993).14
To summarize, when a history of reinforcement has previously
been contacted for responding in-line with socially- and self-
generated rules (e.g., ‘‘In general, report positive evaluations of black
people’’), these rules (EERRs) may influence the probability with
which functionally similar EERRs are publically emitted in similar
contexts (e.g., indicate a positive racial bias on a self-report ques-
tionnaire). Given that direct procedures typically arrange the mea-
surement context in a non-time pressured fashion and specify the
relational response under investigation, the individual has sufficient
time to emit a BIRR (e.g., a negative evaluation of a black person), an
EERR (‘‘In general, report positive evaluations of black people’’),
followed by a response to the BIRR and EERR (e.g., ‘‘Ignore initial
reaction and tick positive response box on a questionnaire). Conse-
quently, it becomes difficult, although not impossible, to ‘‘carve out’’
one response from another in the verbal stream of behavior. Doing so
requires that specific contextual manipulations be implemented
during the experiment that increase the likelihood that responding
remains unaffected by socially- and self-generated rules about the
stimuli under investigation. Finally, and before proceeding, it is
important to realize that rules are functional units like all of the
behaviors discussed thus far and do not constitute anything new at
the level of behavioral process. They are simply examples of the
interaction between complex relational networks and the transfor-
mation of function through those networks (i.e., relationally complex
responses).
7.3. Low complexity higher derivation
So far we have focused on relational responses that vary largely in
their respective levels of complexity. Yet the REC model also draws
attention to situations in which a response is at low complexity but
varies in its level of derivation. For instance, low complexity
responses at the upper boundaries of the derivation continuum are
likely to have been emitted only a small number of times (e.g., the
very first testing trials on equivalence or stimulus relating tasks). As
noted above, these responses may initially be slow and prone to error.
However, as the opportunity to derive the relation increases – both
within and across successive training and testing contexts – so too14 Rules are not exclusively restricted to ‘‘socially-sensitive’’ domains but may
also govern behaviour in other non-socially sensitive areas. For instance, a
participant may respond in accordance with the following ‘‘demand compliant’’
rule: ‘‘I think the experimenter wants to find X. Ergo, I will respond in-line with X’’.will the relative speed and accuracy of the emitted response (e.g.,
O’Hora et al., 2002; Roche et al., 2004).
Throughout much of the past 20 years functional researchers
have exploited relative differences in derivation levels as a means
to probe the strength or probability of pre-existing stimulus
relations. In an early study in this vein, Watt, Keenan, Barnes
and Cairns (1991) attempted to establish a three member equiva-
lence class using Northern Irish and English participants. During
the task a series of conditional discriminations were successfully
trained in which Catholic family names were matched to non-
sense syllables and those same non-sense syllables were then
matched to Protestant symbols. Interestingly, when the research-
ers then tested for equivalence responding (i.e., matching Catholic
names directly to Protestant symbols) many of the Northern Irish
(but not English) participants failed the task. In other words, it
appears that pre-existing verbal relations with a high probability
of having been derived many times in the Northern Irish com-
munity disrupted the formation of low complexity relations that
were inconsistent with that history of learning. This finding
equipped researchers with a novel means to test the strength of
pre-existing relational repertoires concerning clinical anxiety
(Leslie et al., 1993) and social discrimination (Dixon, Rehfeldt,
Zlomke, & Robinson, 2006) not to mention self-knowledge
(Merwin & Wilson, 2005) and child sex abuse (McGlinchey,
Keenan, & Dillenburger, 2000). More generally, this strategy of
pitting relations with the same level of complexity (but different
levels of derivation) against one another is foundational to many
indirect procedures advanced thus far. Tasks such as the IAT and
IRAP arrange the measurement context so that one response
contingency (responding in accordance with pre-experimentally
established stimulus relations) is put into competition with
another (responding in-line with laboratory induced high deriva-
tion relations that are inconsistent with that history of respond-
ing) so that relational response strength can be ascertained.
As we continue further along this continuum from higher to lower
derivation, the RECmodel suggests that responses should increasingly
be emitted with speed and precision. Consider for example newly
established histories of relating generated within an experimental
context via instructions, inferences or statements (e.g., Gast & De
Houwer, 2012; Rydell & Gawronski, 2009; Smith, De Houwer, &
Nosek, in press), evaluative conditioning (Hofmann et al., 2010),
minimal groups manipulations (Paladino & Castelli, 2008) or condi-
tional discrimination tasks (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). More
often than not, these laboratory preparations involve a single training
session aimed at generating low complexity relations towards a range
of novel stimuli such as fictitious individuals, social groups, consumer
brand products and non-sense words. Although a relatively short
history of derivation in combination with low complexity appears to
result in quick and accurate responding, it is important to note that
these relations have been derived far less often than many others in
the individual’s verbal repertoire. Consequently, it may be the case
that relations that are low in complexity but high in derivation are
more malleable to change relative to those that are characterized by
an extended and well-established history of derivation. For instance,
findings related to US revaluation (Walther, Gawronski, Blank &
Langer, 2009), approach-avoidance training (Woud, Becker & Rinck,
2008), persuasion (Smith et al., in press) and descriptive information
(Rydell & McConnell, 2006) reveal that experimentally induced
histories of relating can be generated as well as modified within a
single experimental session.
7.4. High complexity high derivation
Finally, at the furthest corners of the coordinate system reside
responses that are exceptionally high in both complexity and
derivation. Such cases may involve deriving the relation between
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or even for the very first time. Behaviors such as insight,
creativity, abstract mathematics (e.g., Ninness et al., 2006), com-
plex problem-solving (Stewart, Kelly, McHugh, Barnes-Holmes &
O’Hora, submitted for publication), perspective taking (McHugh &
Stewart, 2012) and analogical reasoning (Stewart & Barnes-
Holmes, 2004) may qualify as examples that broadly fall within
this area. Although a detailed treatment of these responses is
beyond the scope of a paper on implicit cognition, it is important
to realize that these behaviors are still relational and thus bound
by the same principles that govern all other types of derived
stimulus relating discussed thus far. To our knowledge, this
particular area of the coordinate system is relatively uncharted
territory as far as an experimental RFT analysis goes, particularly
with regard to creativity, insight, and problem-solving.
Although each of the above phenomena may initially qualify as
instances of high complexity/derivation responding, it is impor-
tant to realize that as their respective levels of derivation
increases, their relative position along our coordinate system will
change. Thus while analogical relations, and the transformations
of function that occur based on those relations, may be in
principle highly complex the very first time they are derived,
subsequent responses to those same relations may be emitted
with greater speed and accuracy across successive derivation
opportunities (e.g., Barnes-Holmes et al., 2005). The same goes
for perspective taking (McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2004). Although speculative, it may be the case that as
derivation moves from high to low so will the complexity of the
ensuing response. To illustrate, consider the following relational
network: moderate pain is the same as jiget and jiget is less than
werte. In the first instance participants may derive elements of the
network by initially considering each of the mutually entailed
relations (‘‘jiget is the same as moderate pain and werte is more
than jiget’’) prior to relating those stimuli in a combinatorial
fashion (‘‘therefore werte is extremely painful). In this case, the
derived response will likely take time to emit and may initially be
low in accuracy. As the number of derivation opportunities
increases, however, participants may respond directly to werte
as extremely painful. Whereas the complexity of the original
relation does not change topographically, functionally speaking,
responding to werte as extremely painful following an extensive
history of derivation may involve a less complex relational response
compared to the first time it was emitted. Put differently, a single
stimulus from a complex relation may come to capture the functions
of the entire network without the need for the individual to derive all
elements of that relation. For example, an individual who is familiar
with the story of the ‘‘Good Samaritan’’ may respond to these two
words in an IRAP as functionally equivalent to the entire story as it
appears in the Bible.
7.5. Conclusion
The current paper proposes a new theoretical model for the
study of implicit cognition that is based on two relatively simple
notions. The first is that complex human behavior (such as
explicit and implicit cognition) reflects the learned and contex-
tually controlled ability to arbitrarily relate events to one another.
The second is that these relational responses can be arranged
along two probabilistic and graded continua as a function of their
relative complexity and history of derivation. In other words, the
REC model attempts to provide a theoretical integration of the
heterogeneous findings obtained from direct and indirect tasks
using two properties of derived stimulus relating; complexity and
levels of derivation (and their temporal parameters). While a
wide range of topographically distinct behaviors are subsumed
under one theoretical umbrella, no radically different processes orconstructs are called upon to accommodate the movement from
simple to complex behavior—just the idea that people can arbitrarily
relate stimuli to one another in increasingly complex ways. From
punctuate priming and IAT effects to multiple stimulus relations
captured by the IRAP, right through to responses on self-report
questionnaires, extended narratives, analogical reasoning, problem
solving, creativity, self and perspective-taking, we argue that it is all
relational. Moreover, we propose that different measurement proce-
dures will be more or less sensitive to brief and immediate versus
extended and elaborated responses depending on the manner in
which they arrange the measurement context.8. BIRRs and EERRs: the role of relational coherence, predictive
validity and awareness
Over and above these various patterns of relational respond-
ing, the REC model makes specific assumptions about the inter-
action between BIRRs and EERRs and their predictive relationship
with other classes of behavior. In the following sections we
articulate when and why different relational responses will either
converge or diverge from one another and predict specific types of
behavior. Thereafter, we briefly consider the ‘‘awareness’’ issue
that has occupied a great deal of theoretical and empirical
attention within this research area.
8.1. Relational coherence
A well-documented finding in the implicit cognition literature
is the possibility for BIRRs to either conflict or correspond with
EERRs towards the same stimuli. For example, several studies
have demonstrated changes in EERRs but not BIRRs (Gawronski &
Strack, 2004; Rydell & McConnell, 2006), BIRRs but not EERRs
(Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001) while still others have reported
corresponding changes in both BIRRs and EERRs (Gawronski,
Walther, & Blank, 2005; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). In explain-
ing these various outcomes the REC model appeals to a third
property of derived relational responding (i.e., relational coher-
ence) that has not been discussed so far in the current article.
Specifically, a relation is said to cohere when all the individual
elements relate to each other in a manner that is consistent with
the reinforcement history typically provided by the verbal com-
munity for such responding. Although non-human animals show
evidence for behavioral consistency based on direct contingency
learning and the formal properties of the related stimuli, humans
alone appear to search for and create consistency between and
among derived stimulus relations involving arbitrary stimuli. To
illustrate, imagine you are presented with the following state-
ment ‘‘10 dollars is more than five dollars and five dollars is more
than one dollar therefore one dollar is more than ten dollars’’. It is
likely that you would recognize the incoherent nature of this
simple relational network and question its veracity. As noted
earlier, once a history of relational responding is in place,
coherence quickly becomes a type of conditioned reinforcer for
future derived stimulus relating (see Barnes, Hegarty, & Smeets,
1997; Hayes et al., 2001; Quin˜ones, 2008; Vitale et al., 2008).
According to the REC model, this search for and application of
relational coherence applies equally to BIRRs and EERRs. Imagine
that you are a ‘‘chauvinistic’’ male with an extreme fear of flying
who is boarding an airplane. Upon entering the cabin you notice
that both the pilot and first-officer are female and immediately
experience momentary surprise as well as the temptation to
cancel your flight and reschedule for an alternative date. On the
one hand, this initial BIRR may conflict with other, subsequent
relational responses that follow (e.g., ‘‘Anyone can be a pilot
regardless of gender’’). Given a history of responding coherently
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reduce or resolve this incoherence such as responding to your
initial response as ‘‘wrong’’. Within an experimental context, this
should lead to discrepant outcomes on direct and indirect
procedures. At the same time, you could consider your initial
response as ‘‘correct’’, but instead choose to respond in-line with
prevailing rules implemented by the wider verbal community
(e.g., ‘‘Negative evaluations based on gender are inappropriate in
modern society’’), or even self-generated rules (e.g., ‘‘I will look like
a chauvinistic pig if I refuse to fly with a female air crew’’). In such
cases, overt responding may be strategically altered prior to being
emitted to better concord with prevailing social norms or the
presumed expectations of the researcher. Once again, within an
experimental context, this should lead to a dissociative pattern of
outcomes on direct and indirect procedures.
On the other hand, it is also possible for BIRRs to be consistent
with subsequently emitted EERRs and as a result lead to conver-
gence between direct and indirect procedures. In the example
above, the individual may conclude that female pilots would be
less capable of dealing with an emergency situation relative to
their male counterparts, which would cohere with their initial
relational response (and result in refusing to board the aircraft). In
an experimental context, such behavior should lead to corre-
sponding outcomes across both direct and indirect procedures.
Although the foregoing analysis suggests that BIRRs generally
precede and are distinct from EERRs, it is important to realize that
they are both relational responses, and thus will interact in a
dynamic fashion. Indeed, an EERR may well generate a BIRR in a
given stream of verbal behavior and vice versa. Applied to the
current example, the individual may emit the EERR ‘‘It is wrong to
discriminate on the basis of gender’’. This may in turn result in a brief
negative self-evaluative response (e.g., ‘‘I am a chauvinistic pig’’)
which in turn produces another EERR (‘‘Okay, calm down, relax,
take some deep breaths, get on the plane and watch a movie’’). While
this relationship between BIRRs and EERRs is potentially infor-
mative, we are not suggesting that the former provides the causal
explanation for the latter. On the contrary, these behavior–
behavior relations are always traced back to the point at which
prediction and influence are in principle directly possible (i.e.,
manipulable contextual variables; see Hayes & Brownstein, 1986).
8.2. Prediction of behavior
In addition to the above mentioned patterns of convergence
and divergence, the outcomes obtained from indirect procedures
often predict a number of behaviors that their direct counterparts
fail to accommodate (and vice versa). In interracial interactions,
for example, indirect effects predict the rate of blinking and eye
contact with a member of another racial group while performance
on direct procedures better predict verbal biases in evaluating a
Black relative to a White interviewer (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami,
Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; see also Fazio et al., 1995;
McConnell & Leibold, 2001). In a similar vein, Richetin, Perugini,
Prestwich and O’Gorman (2007) found that the spontaneous
selection of either fruit or a snack was predicted by IAT perfor-
mance over and above the prediction provided by direct measures
for behavioral food choice.
In explaining the predictive relationships between direct/
indirect effects and future behavior, the REC model draws atten-
tion to the fact that BIRRs and EERRs are functionally defined
classes of behavior that are not restricted to any particular
topography. As noted above, BIRRs can – in principle – not only
take the form of a button press on an indirect behavioral task, but
increased rates of blinking, eye contact, and ‘‘spontaneous’’
selection of stimuli given an appropriate history of learning.
Likewise, EERRs are not restricted to written or oral responseson a questionnaire but can involve the decision to invite job
applicants for an interview (Agerstro¨m & Rooth, 2011) or sup-
porting exclusionary immigration policy proposals (Perez, 2010).
From this perspective, the ability for one type of response (e.g.,
IAT performance) to predict another (amount of eye contact) is
understood functionally as an instance of behavior–behavior
relations. Thus when we ask ‘‘What role does automatic and
controlled thinking play in predicting different types of beha-
vior?’’ we are actually asking about the nature of a behavior–
behavior relation. In doing so, the question of how mental
mediators account for differential patterns of behavior is imme-
diately discarded in favor of an alternative question: what are the
contingencies that will influence the probability of one class of
responses predicting a second class of responses?
Unsurprisingly, the functional researcher once again looks to
the current and historical context for an answer. Within the wider
literature, the predictive relationship between BIRRs/EERRs and
future behavior appears to be influenced by the specific stimuli
being related (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009),
features of the context that influence the probability that beha-
vior will be governed to a greater or lesser extent by BIRRs or
EERRs (Marsh, Johnson, & Scott-Sheldon, 2001), instructions to
self-discriminate brief and immediate responding towards the
stimuli of interest (Scarabis, Florack, & Gosejohann, 2006), the
time available to emit a response (Friese, Wa¨nke, & Plessner,
2006), the mood of the respondent (Hermsen, Holland, & van
Knippenberg, 2006), as well as the degree to which self or socially
generated rules are deployed (Olson & Fazio, 2004). Although
other types of predictive relationships exist between some BIRRs/
EERRs and other BIRRs/EERRs (for a detailed treatment, see
Nosek et al., 2011; Perugini et al., 2010) a REC explanation of
these findings remains firmly rooted at the contextual level—
irrespective of the complexity involved. While a number of
studies have attempted to account for the predictive relationship
between BIRRs and other types of behavior (Barnes-Holmes et al.,
2010; Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012; Roddy et al., 2010;
2011), only simple associative or additive patterns have been
examined. A more detailed understanding of the relationship
between BIRRs/EERRs and future behavior awaits a functional
analysis of increasingly complex patterns of behavior–behavior
relations than is currently available (e.g., double-dissociation/
additive; interactive/multiplicative or partial dissociation pat-
terns; see Perugini et al., 2010).
8.3. The ‘‘awareness’’ issue
As we have seen, people may be ‘‘unwilling’’ to report their
private relational content due to self or socially generated rules.
However, it is equally possible that they are not ‘‘aware’’ of their
private content to begin with or how it relates to their public
behavior. Indeed, research shows time and again that individuals
are often limited in their ability to self-report their brief and
immediate relational activity—even in situations where they are
motivated to do so (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2009). As one
of the ‘‘four horsemen of automaticity’’ (Bargh, 1994), a number of
mechanistic researchers have treated ‘‘awareness’’ as a central or
even defining property of implicit cognition (e.g., Greenwald &
Banaji, 1995; Nosek et al., 2011; although see Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2011).
Critically, awareness is not a technical term from a functional
point of view and we do not intend to make it one. Nevertheless,
in some meaningful sense of the word, derived stimulus relating –
and by implication – implicit cognition can occur with or without
‘‘awareness’’. The REC model argues when a person makes a self-
report concerning their own brief and immediate relational
responding that BIRR is likely participating in a frame of
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negative reaction to that black person’’). When treated in this way,
awareness is emptied of any meta-physical or mental conations
and instead is viewed as a learned, self-discrimination behavior
that develops over time as a history of relating relations to other
relations – and in particular deictic relations – becomes increas-
ingly well established (see Dymond & Barnes, 1996, 1997; Hayes
et al., 2001). As always, this behavior is under contextual control.
Thus when the parameters of the context permit or require the
individual to respond to their on-going relational activity with
deictic relations about that activity, an overt report of BIRRing
should be available. Though ultimately an empirical question, we
expect that a lack of coordination between on-going relational
activity and deictic relations about those relations is most likely
to occur with exceptionally low complexity/derivation responses
that have been relatively well practiced in the past. At the same
time we would expect that awareness or self-discrimination
would increasingly occur as the complexity of the relation
becomes greater or where a history of deriving that relation is
minimal. Finally, it is important that the self-discrimination of a
brief and immediate relational response is separated from self-
discrimination of the history of learning that gave rise to that
response. In the latter case, the individual may respond on the
basis of their BIRR but may not be able to articulate why they had
that BIRR in the first place.9. Implications of the REC model
The current paper has now introduced three new conceptual
tools (relational coherence, complexity and derivation) as well as
a methodological one (the IRAP) that functional researchers can
use when exploring new intellectual islands. These concepts are
non-mediating or mentalistic but simply to refer to properties of
the same behavioral process (arbitrarily applicable relational
responding) that become more or less prevalent in different
(measurement) contexts. Like all definitions, the parsing of rela-
tional responses based on time, complexity, or derivation is a
matter of convention; not fixed or absolute but rather flexible to
further modification in-line with empirical findings. The ‘‘truth’’
or value of the REC model will be a function of how useful it is in
providing a more sophisticated understanding, defined in terms of
achieving greater prediction and influence over private and public
behaviors (with precision, scope and depth) than is currently
available. Although this account requires in-depth empirical
scrutiny, we believe that it can allow functional researchers to
achieve the above goals in a number of novel ways.
9.1. General conceptual issues
By treating implicit cognition as relational responses that can
vary in their complexity and derivation, the REC model orientates
empirical attention away from the traditional notion of ‘‘auto-
matic’’ and ‘‘controlled’’ behaviors and towards a view of implicit
cognition as probabilistic and graded. This account offers a
coherent framework that can accommodate a spectrum of beha-
vioral outcomes, from those that take place within an order of
milliseconds all the way to those that unfold across extended
periods of time. One potential advantage of this position is that it
may account for outcomes that do not fall neatly into ‘‘automatic’’
or ‘‘controlled’’ categories (i.e., reside in the middle of the
complexity-derivation continuum). For mechanistic researchers
a range of effects are located in the ‘‘fuzzy boundary’’ between
automatic and controlled behaviors such as ‘‘semi-automatic
negations’’ (Deutsch et al., 2009), propositional effects on indirect
procedures (De Houwer, 2006; Gast & De Houwer, 2012; Gregget al., 2006), and the ability to control, fake, or modify perfor-
mance on indirect tasks (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2012; Fiedler &
Bluemke, 2005). The REC model seems to provide a rationale for
these findings by emphasizing the utility of moving away from
binary distinctions and towards probabilistic, graded alternatives
(see De Houwer & Moors, in press; Nosek et al., 2011 for similar
suggestions from the mechanistic literature). Although we use
terms such as BIRRs and EERRs throughout the latter sections of
the current paper, they should not be considered binary or
dichotomous but rather convenient ways of talking about
responses that differ in their relative levels of complexity and
derivation.
Our account also provides functional researchers with a nomen-
clature that is not imported from either the lay community or
alternative intellectual traditions. Each of the terms discussed above
are directly rooted in a bottom-up functional theory that coherently
connects basic and complex concepts. One of the advantages of doing
so is a reduced tendency for different levels of analysis to be conflated
with one another (De Houwer, 2011). It should now be apparent that
while mechanistic and functional researchers are interested in similar
behavioral events, BIRRs are not ‘‘implicit’’, ‘‘unconscious’’ ‘‘sponta-
neous’’, ‘‘associative’’ ‘‘impulsive’’ or ‘‘automatic’’. Likewise, EERRs are
not ‘‘explicit’’, ‘‘conscious’’, ‘‘deliberate’’, ‘‘propositional’’, ‘‘reflexive’’ or
‘‘controlled’’. Instead the notions of complexity and derivation open
the concepts of BIRRs and EERRs to a more precise and philosophi-
cally consistent experimental analysis. Questions surrounding the
formation, change and interaction of BIRRs and EERRs, their malle-
ability in the face of historical and current contextual variation,
convergence and divergence, relationship with relational coherence,
as well as their role in clinical, social, health and other psychological
domains can be asked and answered without appeal to explanatory
concepts that are incoherent with the basic theory (RFT) or the
assumptions and goals that underpin contextual behavioral science.9.2. Levels of derivation rather than verbal versus non-verbal
The focus on levels of derivation within the REC model serves
to highlight an important issue that has not been fully appre-
ciated within the general RFT literature. Specifically, while it may
be tempting to view behavior as verbal when it involves derived
relational responding and non-verbal when it involves contact
with direct contingencies of reinforcement or stimulus pairing,
this distinction may be problematic for several reasons. First, and
foremost, an experimental demonstration of ‘‘non-verbal’’ beha-
vior presupposes that the individual can set aside his or her
history of arbitrarily applicable relational responding that is
brought to bear in any given context. Consider a situation where
a verbally trained individual is asked to complete a respondent
learning task where a non-sense word (conditioned stimulus; CS)
is repeatedly paired with an electric shock (unconditioned sti-
mulus; US) across one hundred separate trials. Following training,
the previously neutral CS acquires an aversive function. Defining
this change in behavior due to the pairing of stimuli as ‘‘non-
verbal’’ or as an instance of ‘‘direct contingency learning’’ assumes
that the individual’s history of derived relational responding did
not ‘‘mediate’’ that effect but was somehow ‘‘switched off’’ or set
aside during the task. Now imagine a second scenario whereby a
novel equivalence class is established consisting of A, B and C. The
first time the individual derives the relation between A and C
could be considered as a ‘‘highly verbal’’ behavior. However,
across successive opportunities to derive, the response may be
said to become less derived and more a product of the direct
contingencies contacted within that context (e.g., direct pairing of
A with C, reinforcement contacted for responding coherently with
previous training, or progressing from training to testing). Or to
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becomes less and less ‘‘verbal’’.
From an RFT perspective, however, all behavior based on a
history of arbitrarily applicable relational responding is, by
definition, verbal—irrespective of whether it is increasingly char-
acterized by less and less derivation (see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Cullinan, 2000, pp. 72–75). With respect to the current
paper, although low complexity/derivation responses (BIRRs) may
be topographically similar to behaviors that have been estab-
lished for non-human organisms via direct contingencies, this
does not necessarily mean that they are functionally similar. To
illustrate, consider a parrot that has received a direct history of
reinforcement for emitting the echoic response ‘‘Pretty Polly.’’
Now consider a verbally able human who is ‘‘trained’’ to emit this
echoic response hundreds of times. After such training both
parrot and human will respond with a high degree of speed and
accuracy when prompted appropriately. Imagine, however, that
both parrot and human are then asked ‘‘Who’s opposite to ‘Pretty
Polly’. The parrot will likely respond immediately with the highly
trained echoic (‘‘Pretty Polly’’) whereas the human may respond
appropriately with ‘‘Ugly Polly,’’ thus showing that in the latter
case the response participates in a network of arbitrarily applic-
able relational responses that extends beyond the directly trained
echoic. Even in a case where the human simply repeats ‘‘Pretty
Polly’’ this does not necessarily render the response non-verbal.
For example, imagine the person does respond with ‘‘Ugly Polly’’
when subsequently prompted with ‘‘No, no, I said, who is opposite
to ‘Pretty Polly’.’’ In other words, directly trained responses
cannot be defined as ‘‘non-verbal’’ on an a priori basis for an
individual with a verbal history. Instead, for the verbal human, it
seems more accurate to say that the echoic response is at low
derivation rather than being ‘‘non-verbal.’’ Like Adam and Eve,
once we have bitten from the apple of ‘‘verbal behavior’’ there is
no going back to a non-verbal Garden of Eden.
With the above in mind, we would remind the reader that RFT is
an intensely functional and pragmatic theory of language and
cognition. Specifically, once a protracted history of arbitrarily applic-
able relational responding is in place, it seems useful to define
everything that an individual does thereafter as involving verbal
processes. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a behavior that is not
impacted in some way, shape or form by this prior history of
relational learning. One may argue that ‘‘non-verbal’’ responding is
– in principle – possible but pragmatically speaking there appears to
be no widely agreed upon way to demonstrate a genuinely ‘‘non-
verbal’’ act in a verbally sophisticated human. Thus we believe that
the verbal/non-verbal distinction should be jettisoned in favor of one
that differentiates behaviors based on their respective levels of
derivation; from situations where derivation is minimal and contact
with direct contingencies maximal (e.g., ‘‘mindful’’ activities such as
meditating, ‘‘getting lost in the music’’) to those where derivation is
maximal and contact with direct contingencies is minimal (e.g.,
solving a complex mathematical or logical problem for the first
time).15 Note that this is not an ontological argument—merely a
pragmatic one. For example, researchers can explore the extent to
which a response varies in speed and accuracy or is strengthened or
extinguished as a function of derivation without taking on the15 These conceptual concerns are particularly salient for research with adults
who have an extensive history of relational responding. When the subject of
interest is non-human research or human infants without a history of appropriate
relational responding, the verbal/non-verbal distinction seems to be a more
acceptable and useful one. For instance, given the ‘‘Pretty Polly’’ example above,
one could imagine that a human infant without an extensive history of arbitrarily
applicable relational responding, but who had received an extensive training in
echoing ‘‘Pretty Polly’’, would simply continue to engage in that echoic response
when asked who is the opposite of ‘‘Pretty Polly’’.additional burden of proving that it is also a verbal or non-verbal
act as well.9.3. Limitations and future directions
We believe that the REC model in conjunction with the IRAP
provides functional researchers with an opportunity to partici-
pate fully in the study of implicit cognition alongside our
contemporaries in social and cognitive psychology. That said, a
number of empirical questions require our attention at this time.
First and foremost, although a limited set of RFT studies have
sought to manipulate relational complexity and derivation, a
detailed experimental analysis of the interplay between these
two factors in the production of different types of relational
responses (i.e., BIRRs and EERRs) is clearly needed. This applies
equally to relational coherence and ‘‘awareness’’ as a self-
discriminatory behavior—both as topics in and of themselves as
well as their interaction with the above two factors. To our
knowledge no research has directly explored the intersection
between relational coherence, complexity and derivation with
respect to implicit cognition. Likewise, although ‘‘self-awareness’’ has
been explored elsewhere, its treatment in relation to performances on
direct and indirect procedures is yet to be functionally articulated.
Embarking on the above research agendas would refine our under-
standing of when and why BIRRs and EERRs independently or
interactively predict different classes of behavior.
Second, while a small number of studies have provided experi-
mental evidence for the emergence of BIRRs (e.g., Hughes & Barnes-
Holmes, 2011; O’Reilly, Roche, Ruiz, Tyndall, & Gavin, 2012; O’Toole,
Barnes-Holmes, & Smyth, 2007) a systematic exploration of the
learning histories and current contextual variables critical to estab-
lishing, maintaining, and changing this class of behaviors is clearly
needed. Although IRAP and related research provide support for the
relational nature of implicit cognition, this work has almost exclu-
sively focused on manipulating pre-existing BIRRs and EERRs across a
wide variety of domains (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, in press). Sub-
jecting the environmental regularities that influence these different
classes of behavior to an experimental analysis would serve to
provide a more rigorous test of the assumptions outlined throughout
the current paper. Moreover, the degree to which high complexity/
derivation responses (EERRs) can govern their less complex/derived
counterparts (BIRRs) is also in need of exploration.
Third, the development of BIRRs and EERRs across the lifespan
also needs to be addressed. Of the RFT research conducted with
infants, children and adolescents, very little has investigated the
development and change of implicit cognition over time. Rather
functional researchers interested in this topic have exclusively
focused their attention on adult populations who already have an
extensive history of relating. Given the operant nature of rela-
tional responding, we would expect BIRRs and EERRs to demon-
strate four important properties across all stages of the lifespan
once a history of arbitrarily applicable relational responding is in
place: (a) they should develop, (b) be flexible and amenable to
change, (c) come under stimulus control, and (d) be controlled by
their consequences. Although supportive research has been pro-
vided on all four points for EERRs in adults as well as children
(Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2000; Luciano, Go´mez-Becerra,
& Rodrı´guez-Valverde, 2007), little work has focused on examin-
ing the same properties with respect to BIRRs (although see
Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; O’Toole et al., 2007 for prelimin-
ary work in this vein). Although pragmatic considerations can
interfere with the collection of data in infants, we argue that a
developmental understanding of implicit cognition is certainly
worth the effort (see Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010, for a discussion of
related work in this area).
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EERRing in physiological and neurological domains. Throughout
the current paper we have situated our analysis in terms of the
whole organism operating with and in a given context. In doing
so, we have intentionally downplayed any emphasis on different
levels of analysis (e.g., genetic and neurological) and their role in
relational responding—both fast and slow. Although we whole-
heartedly support a functional investigation of implicit cognition
at these levels, it is important that causality continues to be
framed in terms of events external to the behavior of the
individual and not in terms of elements of the behavioral system
that needs to be explained (see Hayes & Brownstein, 1986 for
several reasons why). Nevertheless, when behavioral genetics and
neuroscience are contextually situated, our understanding of
environment–behavior interactions can only be improved.
Finally, it is important to note that the REC model is an
overarching account of behavior that is not restricted to any
single behavioral domain (e.g., IRAP effects). The notion of BIRRs
and EERRs may prove useful for understanding, predicting and
influencing a host of clinical, health, consumer, forensic, close-
relationships, and organizational, political, sport and social beha-
viors. Our intention was to frame our analysis in a way that could
lead directly to empirical tests and extensions. Time will tell
whether we are successful or not. In the absence of data, a
parsimonious and overarching functional theory such as RFT can
be used to explain many behavioral phenomena in a reasonably
coherent and plausible fashion. Fortunately however, actual data
serve to exert a selective effect upon such theorizing and we are
exquisitely sensitive to this point. In closing, therefore, we
encourage functional researchers to take, use, modify and develop
RFT and the REC model in their own empirical voyages to
uncharted waters and their exploration of foreign intellectual
islands.10. Epilogue
Our treatment of the a priori assumptions and analytic strategies
adopted bymechanistic and functional researchers was driven by two
complementary goals. First, by making explicit the scientific beliefs,
basic units, as well as values that different researchers adhere to, the
rationale for past and future developments within this research area
can be better understood. Indeed, our analysis makes it clear that
neither the mechanistic nor the functional approaches should be
viewed as the conceptualisation of implicit cognition, but instead as
co-existing conceptualisations of implicit cognition. Moreover, any
evaluation of theories, models or procedures from either tradition
that fails to consider the overarching goals, values or assumptions
upon which that program of research is based is either flawed or
simply incomplete.
Our second goal was to illuminate the subtle and seductive
dangers of conflating the cognitive (mechanistic) and functional
(contextual) approaches to psychological science. This is a parti-
cularly salient issue in the study of implicit cognition, which
constitutes a rich melting pot of methodologies, terminology and
theories from either tradition. Unlike clothing items, candy or
food combinations, ‘‘mixing and matching’’ these frameworks
should be avoided at all costs given their different viewpoints
on the goals of science, explanatory concepts and how evidence
should be treated. Although these points of departure may seem
irreconcilable and suggest that fruitful dialog is improbable or
even undesirable, we believe that such a position is detrimental
for all concerned. Rather than subject one another to derision and
scorn we believe that researchers from both traditions would
profit from the recently proposed functional-cognitive framework
advanced by De Houwer (2011) (see also Kahneman, 2002). Forcognitive (mechanistic) researchers, this involves defining out-
comes or effects functionally (i.e., as the causal impact of the
environment on behavior). Doing so circumvents many of the
‘‘behavior-as-proxy’’ challenges highlighted previously, illumi-
nates the environmental causes of behavior and facilitates the
discovery of new mental mediators. For functionally orientated
researchers, the mechanistic approach may provide access to
novel methodologies and previously unconsidered domains that
can be used to further refine existing functional theories and
models. Furthermore, building a rich body of functional knowl-
edge may be profitable for both traditions given that (a) it would
enforce much needed constraints on mental explanations and help
facilitate the selection of mental accounts from one another,
(b) provide information about environment–behavior interactions
that could be used to refine existing functional theories as well as
(c) lead to new conceptual tools for describing in non-mental terms
behavioral effects and the conditions under which these effects occur.
We hope that the analysis and discussion offerred throughout the
current paper not only clarify the nature of and relation between
different approaches to implicit cognition but also stimulate contin-
ued dialog and progression within and between these respective
traditions.Acknowledgments
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